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Abstract 
The EU Emissions Trading Scheme continues to exempt industries deemed at risk of carbon leakage 
from permit auctions. Carbon leakage risk is established based on the carbon intensity and trade 
exposure of each 4-digit industry. Using a novel measure of carbon leakage risk obtained in interviews 
with almost 400 managers at regulated firms in six countries, we show that carbon intensity is strongly 
correlated with leakage risk whereas overall trade exposure is not. In spite of this, most exemptions 
from auctioning are granted to industries with high trade exposure to developed and less developed 
countries. Our analysis suggests two ways of tightening the exemption criteria without increasing 
relocation risk among non-exempt industries. The first one is to exempt trade exposed industries only 
if they are also carbon intensive. The second one is to consider exposure to trade only with less 
developed countries. By modifying the carbon leakage criteria along these lines, European 
governments could raise additional revenue from permit auctions of up to €3 billion per year, based on 
a permit price of €30.  
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1 Introduction
It is widely recognized that the problem of carbon leakage poses a major challenge for design-
ing effective unilateral policies aimed at mitigating global climate change. In its most direct
manifestation, carbon leakage occurs when polluting plants that are subject to climate policy
relocate to an unregulated jurisdiction. Since carbon emissions are a global pollutant, their
“leaking” to unregulated places reduces the environmental benefits from the policy. In addition,
carbon leakage creates an excess burden for those countries that regulate emissions to the extent
that relocation reduces output, employment, and taxable profits at home.
Not surprisingly, carbon leakage takes the center stage whenever new climate change reg-
ulation is up for debate. So far, the most common deterrent against carbon leakage has been
to either compensate or to exempt those industries deemed to be most adversely affected by
the policy. For instance, virtually all of the numerous carbon taxes that have emerged in Eu-
rope since the 1990’s grant rebates or exemptions to energy-intensive firms in order to prevent
them from relocating.1 While this practice may be justified from the point-of-view of industrial
policy, it runs counter to the polluter-pays principle underlying environmental policy-making
in the EU. It also gives way to rent-seeking behavior, as regulated firms have an incentive to
exaggerate their compliance costs in order to receive more generous compensation. Addressing
carbon leakage is therefore a difficult and controversial policy issue.
This paper empirically analyzes the current scheme to prevent carbon leakage implemented
in the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), the world’s first and largest re-
gional cap-and-trade system for greenhouse gas emissions. During the first eight years of the
EU ETS, leakage was addressed by offering manufacturing firms generous compensation in the
form of allocating most emission allowances free of charge. In the current, third trading phase,
which runs from 2013 until 2020, the European Commission (EC) gradually reduces the pro-
portion of free allowances allocated to manufacturing firms. At the same time, and contrary to
its stated objective of achieving full auctioning of emission allowances, the EC exempts from
this transition more than three quarters of the regulated emissions from manufacturing, on the
1Contrary to this view, a recent study of the UK Climate Change Levy finds no causal impact of carbon taxation
on output, employment or plant exit among manufacturing firms (Martin et al., 2011).
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grounds that the firms accounting for those emissions are at risk of carbon leakage. Exemptions
are granted according to two simple criteria, namely the carbon intensity of value added and
trade exposure, both measured at the level of the 4-digit industry code.
Our paper assesses the accuracy of these criteria based on a novel firm-level measure of
leakage risk we gathered in telephone interviews with managers of 390 manufacturing firms in
six European countries which are regulated under the EU ETS. The flexibility of the interview
based approach, along with the bias-reducing format of the survey tool developed by Bloom
and van Reenen (2007) and adapted to the climate policy context in Martin et al. (2012, 2014),
allows us to elicit valuable information on politically contentious issues such as a firm’s vulner-
ability to carbon pricing, defined as the firm’s propensity to downsize or relocate in response to
climate change policy.
We show that carbon intensity is strongly correlated with our interview-based measure of
vulnerability whereas trade intensity is not. This is a reason for concern because most ex-
emptions from auctioning are granted on the basis of the trade intensity criterion alone. We
propose two simple improvements to the exemption criteria, based on the principle that free
permits should only be given to industries where the average relocation propensity is signifi-
cantly higher than that of non-exempt industries. First, by not exempting trade intensive sectors
but the ones that are at least moderately carbon intensive as well, European governments could
raise additional auction revenue of up to C3 billion every year, based on the carbon price of
30C/tCO2 which is used in the official economic analysis that justifies the leakage criteria (EU
Commission, 2009). Alternatively, we show that a sector’s intensity of trade with less devel-
oped countries such as China is a better proxy for vulnerability than the overall trade intensity.
A change in the current trade intensity criterion along these lines could raise C430 million in
auction revenues per year in addition to the revenue under the current auction rules.
In extending the normative analysis of industry compensation rules in the EU ETS by
Martin et al. (2014), this paper contributes further evidence of practical value on this con-
troversial aspect of climate policy. This will be relevant for the impending revision of the
carbon leakage criteria by the EU Commission, but our findings also inform climate policy
far beyond the European context. This is because criteria similar to the ones used by the
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EC have been adopted in actual and proposed legislation underlying half a dozen regional
carbon trading schemes world wide. For instance, emission intensity and trade intensity are
used to determine eligibility for compensation in the recently implemented carbon trading
schemes in California and Switzerland, in Australia’s Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme and
in New Zealand’s ETS. Moreover, these metrics were proposed for a US wide cap-and-trade
scheme under the 2009 Waxman-Markey Bill, and will be applied in a future South Korean
ETS (http://www.ieta.org/worldscarbonmarkets). In view of this, it is worthwhile to
study how these criteria relate to leakage risk, as assessed by the very managers who decide on
relocation.
The next section describes the policy background and summarizes the relevant literature.
Section 3 describes the data set and explains our regression based test. Section 4 presents the
results and Section 5 discusses their implications for the auction revenues forgone by the actual
policy. Section 6 concludes.
2 Policy background: Carbon Leakage and the EU ETS
2.1 Carbon leakage
Although the objective of the EU ETS is the mitigation of a global environmental problem, the
policy limits greenhouse gas emissions only in the EU – not globally. In the Carbon Leak-
age Decision,2 the European Commission acknowledges that this “could lead to an increase in
greenhouse gas emissions in third countries where industry would not be subject to comparable
carbon constraints (‘carbon leakage’) and undermine the environmental integrity and benefit of
actions by the Union”. Matthes (2008) distinguishes between two forms of leakage. Investment
leakage occurs in the medium-to-long run as firms do not expand their production facilities in
Europe or fail to reinvest in facilities that have reached the end of their economic lifetime. Op-
erational leakage denotes the short-term phenomenon of production activity being decreased or
shut down completely in Europe and its possible relocation to other countries without carbon
2Cf. Commission Decision 2010/2/EU determining, pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council, a list of sectors and subsectors which are deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of
carbon leakage (2010) OJ L 1/10 (Carbon Leakage Decision).
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pricing. Since our empirical analysis relies on interviews with managers of existing facilities,
the results are most pertinent to operational leakage.
The evident economic solution to the leakage problem is to adjust the price of goods for the
implicit carbon cost when they cross the border (see e.g. Monjon and Quirion, 2010). However,
such border adjustments – in addition to raising a number of practical issues – may collide with
the rules of the World Trade Organization (e.g. Quirion and Monjon, 2011; Joure´ et al., 2013).
The EU ETS has been relying on free permit allocation as the principal instrument to avoid
leakage. Incentives for investment leakage are mitigated by granting free emission permits
to new facilities (the EU ETS sets aside permits for this purpose in a ‘new entrant reserve’).
Conversely, all freely allocated emissions allowances are cancelled when a regulated facility
closes, thereby penalizing operating leakage. If properly designed and enforced, this plant
closure provision deters carbon leakage because free allocation is contingent on the continued
activity of the plant.3 The drawback of this is a distortion of productive efficiency because
free permits act like an output subsidy (Fischer and Fox, 2007; Quirion, 2009, discusses this
in the EU ETS context).4 Specifically, the plant closure provision may render the operation of
otherwise inefficient plants profitable (Matthes and Monjon, 2008).5
2.2 Permit allocation
In phases I and II of the EU ETS, each member state drew up a National Allocation Plan (NAP)
that fixed the national cap and determined the sectoral permit allocation. In developing their
3This deterrent for carbon leakage hinges on free allowance allocation and hence loses bite during the transition
to full auctioning, unless low carbon innovation creates a lock-in effect (Schmidt and Heitzig, 2014).
4Extending earlier work by Demailly and Quirion (2006) on the cement sector, Monjon and Quirion (2011)
use a computable partial equilibrium model to compare border adjustments and output based allocation. They find
that the most efficient way to prevent carbon leakage in the EU ETS is by combining full auctioning of emissions
allowances with border adjustments. In a theoretical analysis, Meunier, Ponssard, and Quirion (2012) show that a
combination of output based and capacity based allowance allocation is second-best when border adjustments are
not available.
5Notice that making permit allocation contingent on the firm’s decisions at the extensive (continued operation)
or intensive margins (output) leads to outcomes no longer being independent of the initial permit allocation. As
Hahn and Stavins (2011) note, this ‘independence property’ of emissions trading follows from the Coase theorem
under certain conditions (a competitive permit market, rational behavior, and lack of transaction costs, regulatory
uncertainty or credit constraints). In a recent study of the RECLAIM program in Southern California, Fowlie and
Perloff (2013) test and cannot reject the hypothesis that plant-level abatement of nitrogen oxides was independent
of the permit allocation. For the EU ETS, Reguant and Ellerman (2008) obtain a similar finding in a study of
Spanish electricity generators. In contrast, Abrell et al. (2011) find some evidence that the EU ETS increased
employment at firms that received allowances in excess of their verified emissions.
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NAPs in phase I most of the countries opted for “grandfathering”, i.e. free permit allocations
based on historical emissions (Ellerman, Buchner, and Carraro, 2007). In phase II, the member
states imposed more stringent caps so as to honor their commitment to the EU’s joint emission
target under the Kyoto Protocol, but they also retained free allocation. Auctioning fell far short
of what was allowed, and benchmarking remained an exception (Ellerman and Joskow, 2008).
Since the beginning of phase III, the allocation of all allowances has been relegated from na-
tional governments back to Brussels. The amended Emissions Trading Directive 2009/29/EC6
advances the transition toward full auctioning of permits as the basic principle of allocation and
stipulates a harmonized allocation scheme to reduce competitive distortions among producers of
similar products across member states. The two main features that lead the way to this scheme
are (i) the use of benchmarks which rewards operators who have taken early action to reduce
the emission intensity of production, and (ii) the continued free allocation to sectors considered
at risk of carbon leakage.7
To the extent possible, benchmarks are defined in tons of CO2 equivalent per unit of out-
put of a specific product.8 They reflect the average greenhouse gas emission performance of
the 10% best performing installations in the EU producing that product, based on the average
emissions intensity in 2007-2008.9 The amount of free permits is obtained by multiplying the
benchmark with the historical reference activity level, defined as the median activity level over
the years from 2005 until 2008 (or from 2009 until 2010, if larger). Total allocations calculated
in this way are scaled by a factor that takes a value of 0.8 in 2013 and declines linearly to a fac-
tor of 0.3 in 2020.10 This factor is meant to accomplish the gradual transition to full auctioning
foreseen already in the original Emissions Trading Directive 2003/87/EC.
6Cf. Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 amending Directive
2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme of the Community
(2009) OJ L 140/63 (Emissions Trading Directive).
7Recall that the focus of this paper is on the manufacturing sector. Operators in the power generation sector no
longer receive any free allowances, although some exceptions to this apply in eight of the member states that have
joined the EU since 2004.
8Where deriving a product benchmark is not feasible, a hierarchy of fallback approaches is applied, as explained
in detail by Sartor, Pallie`re, and Lecourt (2014).
9Cf. Commission Decision 2011/87/EU determining transitional Union-wide rules for harmonized free alloca-
tion of emission allowances pursuant to Article 10a of Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council (2011) OJ L 130/1 (Benchmarking Decision).
10Furthermore, a uniform correction factor is applied if necessary to align the total free allocation to bench-
marked installations with the overall cap on emissions.
5
Figure 1: Sectors exempt from permit auctions
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Notes: The figure shows a scatter plot of the carbon and trade intensities of 4-digit (NACE 1.1) manufacturing industries, based on 9,061 EU
ETS installations. The size of the circles is proportional to the number of firms in a given industry. Sectors in areas A, B1, B2 and C will
continue to be exempt from permit auctions in EU ETS phase III. Source: Martin et al. (2014).
2.3 Carbon leakage sectors
To mitigate the competitiveness impacts of permit auctioning, the European Commission grants
100% of benchmark allocations for free to firms in sectors that are considered at risk of carbon
leakage. The Carbon Leakage Decision stipulates that leakage risk of a sector or subsector be
assessed on the basis of its carbon intensity (CI) and/or trade intensity (TI). The former proxies
for the cost burden imposed by full auctioning, and is measured as the sum of the direct and
indirect costs of permit auctioning, divided by the gross value added of a sector. The direct
costs are calculated as the value of direct CO2 emissions, where a proxy price of 30C/tCO2 is
used. Indirect costs measure the exposure to electricity price increases that are inevitable on
account of full permit auctioning in the power sector. To calculate indirect costs, electricity
consumption (in MWh) is multiplied by the average emission intensity of electricity generation
in the EU27 countries (0.465 tCO2/MWh), and by the same proxy price of 30C/tCO2 for one
European Union Allowance. The TI metric is calculated as “the ratio between the total value of
exports to third countries plus the value of imports from third countries and the total market size
for the Community (annual turnover plus total imports from third countries” (EU Commission,
2009, p. 24).
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In addition, a combination of thresholds for CI and TI is used to establish carbon leakage
risk. For a sector to be considered at significant risk of carbon leakage, its CI must be greater
than 5% and its TI greater than 10%, or else its CI or TI is greater than 30%. Following this,
we classify carbon leakage sectors into four mutually exclusive categories:11
• A: high carbon intensity (CI > 30%)
• B1: high trade intensity and low carbon intensity (CI ≤ 5% ∩ TI > 30%),
• B2: high trade intensity and moderate carbon intensity (5% <CI ≤ 30% ∩ TI > 30%),
• C: moderate carbon and trade intensities (5% <CI ≤ 30% ∩ 10% < TI ≤ 30).
Figure 1 plots the location of 4-digit sectors in a diagram with CI on the vertical and TI on the
horizontal axis.12 Two facts are immediate from this graph: First, category B1 contains most of
the sectors the EC considers at risk of carbon leakage. Second, most of these carbon leakage
sectors are not carbon intensive at all, as their carbon intensity is less than 5%. Figure 2 plots
the relative size of the resulting five categories in terms of the shares in the number of firms,
in employment and in CO2 emissions.13 B2 is the largest group of exempted firms in terms of
employment, but B1 has the largest share of exempted emissions. The share of CO2 emissions
that is not exempt from auctioning amounts to only 15% of permits surrendered on average
in 2007 and 2008. Using an alternative approach, Juergens et al. (2013) obtain a somewhat
higher estimate of 23%.14 Both these estimates highlight that the Carbon Leakage Decision
leaves most pollution rights with European industry, not tax payers, and hence undermines the
principle of full auctioning established in the amended ETS directive.
In view of such far-reaching distributive consequences, it is imperative that the criteria for
identifying carbon leakage sectors be as accurate as possible. This aspect has received much
11This follows Directive 2009/29/EC’s categorization except that category B is here further divided in two.
12Similar graphical representations have been used by Clo` (2010) and Martin et al. (2014). The EUTL-ORBIS
data used here are described in Section 3.1.
13As described in Section 3.1, installation-level data is aggregated at the firm level and only firms for which
employment and sector are available are kept in the sample.
14The discrepancy between their estimate and ours arises because theirs is based not only on data from EUTL
and the Impact Assessment Report accompanying the Carbon Leakage Decision (EU Commission, 2009), but
also on confidential data on CO2 emissions which the member states made available to the EC but which are not
available to us. It is likely that the true value lies somewhere in between these figures.
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Figure 2: Relative size of the non-exempt and different exemption groups
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Notes: The chart displays the relative size of each group of NACE industries which are defined by the exemption criteria. Category B (very
trade intensive sectors) is subdivided into low (B1) and moderate carbon intensity (B2). The sample includes the 3,247 manufacturing firms
participating in the EU ETS and matched to ORBIS employment and sector data. The first bar indicates a group’s share in the total number
of firms, the second bar its share in employment, and the third bar its share in CO2 emissions, based on the number of surrendered permits
recorded in the EUTL. To compute CI and TI figures at the NACE 4-digit level, we follow the methodology and databases used by the EU
Commission (2009). Source: Martin et al. (2014).
less attention in the economic literature thus far than the analysis of policy instruments to pre-
vent leakage discussed in Section 2.1 above.15 Ex ante evaluations have suggested that the EU
ETS adversely impacts on production in most regulated industries while rising electricity prices
lower the profitability of highly exposed industries such as primary aluminum production (e.g.
Demailly and Quirion, 2008; Reinaud, 2005). These studies also show that free permit alloca-
tion offsets negative profit impacts in most industries, and can even lead to overcompensation
(Smale et al., 2006). In a review of this literature, Sato et al. (2007) propose to use trade inten-
sity, carbon intensity and electricity intensity as proxies for the competitiveness impact of the
EU ETS.
There is, however, little empirical evidence to date that directly links cross-sector variability
in CI and TI to heterogeneity in the relocation response to carbon pricing. In fact, a nascent
literature on the ex-post analysis of the impact of the EU ETS on international competitiveness
(reviewed in detail by Martin et al., 2013) does not suggest that industrial firms on the whole
suffered strong adverse impacts when permits were allocated for free in the first years of the
EU ETS (e.g. Abrell et al., 2011; Commins et al., 2011; Bushnell et al., 2013; Chan et al., 2013;
15Another strand of the literature assesses aggregate leakage effects by calibrating computable general equilib-
rium models that are capable of predicting the consequences of differential carbon pricing across regions. Branger
and Quirion (2014) review 25 studies from 2004 to 2012 and report that typical carbon leakage estimates range
from 5% to 25%. These figures do not speak, however, to the leakage risk in specific industries, which is the focus
of this paper.
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Wagner et al., 2013; Petrick and Wagner, 2014).
In a recent paper, Martin et al. (2014) analyze the link between free allowance allocation in
the EU ETS and carbon leakage. In taking a normative approach to this issue, they propose that
free allowances should be distributed across firms so as to minimize leakage, subject to a given
amount of foregone auction revenue. They conduct numerical simulations of the efficiency
gains of the resulting allocation rule. The focus of the present paper is on the positive analysis
of the accuracy of the carbon leakage criteria, and on providing simple rules for improving
them.
3 Data and Methods
3.1 Data
We use a unique firm-level data set constructed by Martin et al. (2014) for analyzing the link
between permit allocation and the risk of carbon leakage. A key ingredient of this data set is a
measure of a firm’s propensity to downsize or relocate in response to carbon pricing, collected
from 770 interviews with managers of 761 manufacturing firms in six European countries: Bel-
gium, France, Germany, Hungary, Poland and the UK. The interviews ran from late August
until early November 2009, and 429 of them were with ETS firms. As in Bloom and van
Reenen (2007), interviews were conducted over the telephone and follow a protocol intended
to minimize cognitive bias. This was achieved by asking managers open-ended questions and
having the interviewers score the answer to each question according to a common benchmark.
The large sample size and interviewer rotation means that it is possible to control for possible
bias on the part of the interviewers, e.g. by including interviewer fixed effects in regression
analysis (see also Bloom and van Reenen, 2010). More details on the interview process and
firms’ characteristics are provided in Martin et al. (2014).16
Our empirical analysis focuses on the managers’ response to the question: “Do you expect
that government efforts to put a price on carbon emissions will force you to outsource part of
16For instance, the web appendix to Martin et al. (2014) corroborates that firms were contacted at random,
and that there was no selection on observable characteristics in a firm’s decision to concede an interview when
contacted.
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the production of this business site in the foreseeable future, or to close down completely?”.
Interviewers recorded the answer as an ordinal ‘vulnerability score’ (VS) which ranges from
1 to 5. The highest score of 5 was assigned if the manager expected the plant to be closed
completely, whereas the lowest score of 1 was given if the manager expected no detrimental
impacts at all. A score of 3 was assigned if the manager expected that at least 10% of production
and/or employment would be outsourced in response to future policies. Scores of 2 or 4 were
given to account for intermediate responses. Table 1 presents the empirical distribution of the
vulnerability score (VS) for the cross-section of 390 interviewed firms that are part of the EU
ETS and for which data on both carbon intensity and regional trade intensity are available.17
Martin et al. (2014) note that none of the principal manufacturing industries in the sample
exhibit a significant risk of firm relocation or closure. Only Other Minerals has an average score
slightly above 3, and for a few sectors, including Iron and Steel, Ceramics, Glass, and Fuels,
the 95% confidence interval includes a score of 3. In no case does the 95% confidence interval
around the point estimates include the maximum score, meaning that the possibility of complete
relocation in response to carbon pricing seemed very unlikely at the time the interviews were
conducted (Martin et al., 2014).
The interview data are augmented with “hard” data on employment and turnover from the
ORBIS database (Bureau van Dijk, 1999-2008), which also provides information on 4-digit
NACE codes. A mapping from the European Union Transaction Log (EUTL, formerly known
as CITL; EU Commission, 2005-2010) to ORBIS by Calel and Dechezlepreˆtre (2012) allows us
to match firms and countries that are not included in our interviews.18 This results in a sample
of 9,061 installations (5,037 firms) which account for 75 percent of EUTL installations and 76
percent of surrendered CO2 allowances. The EUTL contains data on emissions and allocations
for Phases I and II. Employment and sectoral NACE rev 1.1 classification is available for 4,254
firms, of which 3,810 are manufacturing firms. Data from EUROSTAT (2010a,b,c) were used
17The criteria defining sectors at risk of carbon leakage were published on June 5, 2009 (Directive 2009/29/EC),
i.e. two months before the first interviews were conducted. It is therefore possible that some managers correctly
anticipated that they would receive free permits, and that this could have biased their reported VS. Martin et al.
(2014) test and cannot reject the hypothesis that the available information on free permit allocation did not influence
the responses to the hypothetical question underlying VS.
18We thank Rafael Calel and Antoine Dechezlepreˆtre for graciously providing us with NACE code identifiers
and employment data based on their mapping.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the vulnerability score
Mean Min P25 Median P75 Max Firms
Overall vulnerability score 2.15 1.46 1 1 1 3 5 390
A. by country
Belgium 1.86 1.21 1 1 1 3 5 74
France 2.15 1.47 1 1 1 4 5 88
Germany 2.53 1.72 1 1 1 5 5 85
Hungary 1.71 1.12 1 1 1 3 4 34
Poland 2.37 1.48 1 1 2 4 5 54
UK 2.00 1.33 1 1 1 3 5 55
B. by 3-digit sector
Cement 2.50 1.56 1 1 2 4 5 54
Ceramics 2.80 1.79 1 1 3 4 5 5
Chemical & Plastic 2.15 1.42 1 1 1 3 5 66
FabricatedMetals 2.33 1.15 1 1 3 3 3 3
Food & Tobacco 1.71 1.16 1 1 1 2 5 68
Fuels 2.71 1.59 1 1 3 4 5 14
Furniture & NEC 1.00 . 1 1 1 1 1 1
Glass 2.82 1.56 1 1 3 4 5 28
Iron & Steel 3.00 1.60 1 1 3 5 5 23
Machinery & Optics 1.56 1.13 1 1 1 1 4 9
OtherBasicMetals 1.50 0.84 1 1 1 2 3 6
OtherMinerals 3.29 1.80 1 1 3 5 5 7
Publishing 1.20 0.45 1 1 1 1 2 5
TVCommunication 2.00 2.00 1 1 1 3 5 4
Textile & Leather 1.67 1.63 1 1 1 1 5 6
Vehicles 1.55 1.06 1 1 1 1 4 22
Wood & Paper 1.93 1.41 1 1 1 3 5 69
Standard 
deviation
Notes: Summary statistics of the overall vulnerability score (first row), by country (panel A) and by 3-digit NACE sector (panel B). The score
ranges from 1 (no impact) to 5 (complete relocation). A score of 3 is given if at least 10% of production of employment would be outsourced
in response to future carbon pricing. NEC: Not elsewhere classified.
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to reproduce as closely as possible the EC’s calculation of the sector-level variables CI and TI.
Finally, firm-level data on permit allocations for Phase III was obtained from the the National
Implementation Measures (NIM).19 For a more comprehensive description of the dataset, the
interested reader is referred to Martin et al. (2014), which also contains further evidence that
the VS is a reliable measure of firms’ downsizing risk.
3.2 A regression based test
To evaluate the accuracy of the EC’s carbon leakage criteria, we examine how they correlate
with VS. In particular, CI and TI should be positively correlated with VS. We test this hy-
pothesis by estimating partial correlations in a regression framework that controls for possible
confounders at the firm and sector levels. The basic regression equation is given by
VSi,s,c = β0 +βTTIs+βCCIs+x′i,s,cβx +δc+ εi,s,c (1)
whereVSi,s,c is the vulnerability score of firm i in sector s and country c, T Is andCIs are the trade
and carbon criteria at the sector level, and xi,s,c is a vector including higher order terms of these
variables and interviewer fixed effects to control for possible bias on the part of the interviewers.
Moreover, we control for interview noise due to the manager’s characteristics – by including
the tenure in the company, dummies for gender and professional background (technical or law)
– and due to the time of the interview – by including dummies for month, day of week and time
of day (am/pm). As a robustness check, we also include firm-level employment and capital. All
specifications include a full set of country dummies δc.
It could be argued that the continuous relationship between VS, CI and TI imposed in these
regressions is not appropriate for the EC’s threshold based approach. We thus modify equation
(1) to include a set of dummy variables representing the exemption categories (A,B,C) defined
19We thank Oliver Sartor, Stephen Lecourt and Cle´ment Pallie`re for kindly providing us with the data for 20 of
these countries, for which they collected and matched the NIM data on free permit allocation to ORBIS (Sartor
et al., 2014). We complemented this dataset with the NIM data for Belgium and Hungary, which we matched to
ORBIS by hand. In total, this results in a sample of nearly 8,000 installations covering 95% of the emissions.
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above instead of the continuous variables TI and CI.
VSi,s,c = γ0 + γAI{i∈A}+ γBI{i∈B}+ γCI{i∈C}+x′i,s,cγx +δc+ηi,s,c (2)
The omitted category in this regression comprises all firms that are not exempt under the Carbon
Leakage Decision. We estimate these regressions using ordinary least squares and calculate
robust standard errors which are clustered at the 4-digit NACE code level.20
4 Results
4.1 Baseline specifications
Table 2 summarizes the results of various versions of regression equation (1). In the univariate
specifications, we find a strong positive association of VS with carbon intensity, but no statisti-
cally significant association with trade intensity. This result is robust when both measures are
included in a quadratic form that is better suited to capture possible effects of interactions and
non-linearities. For instance, trade exposure could matter for very high values of TI only, or
only when it coincides with high CI. There is no evidence of such effects, and the same con-
clusion arises from a probit specification where the dependent variable indicates that the VS
is larger than 2 (reported in column 8). Weighting the regression equation (1) by employment
does not change the qualitative findings but gives rise to a larger estimate for the impact on
CI. This suggests that CI is a particularly good measure of the risk of downsizing among large
firms. In sum, our regression-based test reveals that TI is not a good indicator to measure the
risk of downsizing or outsourcing whereas CI is.
We obtain similar results when looking at exemption categories. The first column of Table
3 reports the results obtained for equation (2). Only the very carbon intensive group (A) has
an average VS significantly higher than the reference category (firms that are not exempt from
auctioning). But even in group A there is no dramatically high risk of downsizing or outsourcing
for the average firm. The 95%-confidence band for the VS in group A just about includes
20Clustering standard errors at the 3-digit NACE code level does not warrant any changes to the inference drawn
below.
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Table 2: Vulnerability score and exemption criteria
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Vulnerability Score (VS) VS>2
Sectoral Trade -0.013 0.056 0.055 0.098 0.072 0.014 0.031
            Intensity (TI) (0.093) (0.115) (0.097) (0.117) (0.111) (0.114) (0.110)
Carbon Intensity (CI) 0.235*** 0.462** 0.295*** 0.475*** 0.448** 0.405* 0.390**
(0.060) (0.213) (0.089) (0.114) (0.220) (0.237) (0.194)
TI X TI 0.005 0.002 0.020 0.034
(0.075) (0.074) (0.073) (0.067)
CI X CI -0.039 -0.036 -0.024 -0.035
(0.037) (0.038) (0.039) (0.034)
TI X CI 0.050 0.078 0.060 0.056 0.083 0.048
(0.106) (0.091) (0.133) (0.103) (0.095) (0.093)
Employment (ln) -0.039 -0.082
(0.064) (0.079)
Capital (ln) 0.022
(0.043)
Weights no no no no employment no no no
Observations 390 390 390 390 390 390 368 389
Notes: OLS regressions in columns 1 to 4 and 6 and 7, Weighted Least Squares (WLS) regression in column 5, and Probit regression in column
8. The dataset is a cross-section of 390 interviewed firms that are part of the EU ETS and for which EUTL, sectoral trade and carbon intensity
data are available. The dependent variable is the vulnerability score of the firm given by the interviews data. In column 5, the score is weighted
by the firm’s employment. As explanatory variables, CI indicates carbon intensity and TI trade intensity which are calculated using data from
Eurostat and the EU Commission. X indicates that two variables are interacted. Employment and capital are averages over the years from
2005 to 2008, taken from Orbis. Capital is measured as Fixed Assets and is not available for 22 firms of the sample. All regressions include a
constant, interview noise controls and country dummies (not reported). Robust standard errors, clustered by 4-digit NACE sector, are given in
parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***) level.
the value of 3, which means a reduction of at least 10% in production or employment due to
outsourcing.
Taken together, the regression results obtained in equations (1) and (2) suggest that the
efficiency of the allocation scheme could be enhanced if the exemption criteria or associated
thresholds were modified so as to better reflect the true risk of carbon leakage. The next section
considers two simple modifications along these lines.
4.2 Extensions
4.2.1 Modifying intensity thresholds
The result that the average VS in categories B and C is not significantly higher than in sectors
not exempt from auctioning suggests that subjecting sectors in these categories to auctioning
would not raise overall relocation risk. However, category B is very heterogeneous. While
most sectors in this category are not carbon intensive at all (CI < 5), there is a small number
of sectors with intermediate carbon intensity (5 <CI < 30), as shown in Figure 1. In order to
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Table 3: Vulnerability score and exemption categories
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Vulnerability Score Vulnerability Score>2
CI>30 (A) 1.080*** 1.065*** 2.015*** 0.757*** 1.726***
(0.284) (0.291) (0.510) (0.230) (0.440)
0.229
(0.259)
0.119 0.136 0.360 0.104 0.272
(0.250) (0.244) (0.241) (0.236) (0.292)
-0.047 0.059 -0.060 0.125
(0.244) (0.329) (0.235) (0.389)
0.598* 1.033*** 0.508** 1.269***
(0.317) (0.322) (0.252) (0.418)
Weights no no employment no employment
Observations 390 390 390 390 390
TI>30 ∩  CI<30 (B)
10<TI<30 ∩  5<CI<30 (C) 
B ∩  CI<5 (B1)
B ∩  CI>5 (B2)
Notes: OLS regressions in columns 1 and 2, WLS in column 3 and Probit regressions in columns 4 and 5. The dataset is a cross-section of
390 interviewed firms that are part of the EU ETS and for which EUTL, sectoral trade and carbon intensity data are available. The dependent
variable is the vulnerability score (on a scale of 5) of the firm given by the interviews data in regressions 1 to 3, and a dummy indicating whether
the score is higher than 2 in regressions 4 and 5. In columns 3 and 5, the firm’s employment is used to weight the regression. CI indicates
carbon intensity and TI trade intensity, calculated using data from Eurostat and the EU Commission. Based on these, dummies are constructed
to represent belonging to categories A, B and C, as well as B1 and B2. These are used as explanatory variables. Columns 4 and 5 report
marginal effects of the probit regressions. All regressions include a constant, interview noise controls and country dummies (not reported).
Robust standard errors, clustered by 4-digit NACE sector, in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10% (*), 5%(**) and
1%(***) level.
account for this heterogeneity, we subdivide category B into a group with low CI (B1) and one
with intermediate CI (B2).
When these separate groups are included along with groups A and C in regression equation
(2), the more carbon-intensive sectors in group B exhibit a significantly higher risk of outsourc-
ing than the reference group, even though, as is the case for group A, the risk of downsizing or
closure does not attain very high levels for the average firm (cf. columns 2 and 3 of Table 3).
This result holds up when the regression is weighted by employment. In fact, the coefficient
estimates on groups A and B2 both become stronger, indicating that some of the larger firms in
those categories are at a higher leakage risk.
In order to account for the qualitative difference between a slight increase in downsizing
risk and a strong downsizing impact, we also estimate Probit regressions of the binary event
that a firm has a VS of 3 or larger. The results, reported in columns 4 and 5 of Table 3, confirm
that only groups A and B2 present some risk of downsizing. It would therefore seem justified
to adjust the thresholds for exemption accordingly.
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Table 4: Vulnerability score and region-specific trade intensities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Vulnerability Score
Sectoral Carbon Intensity (CI) 0.239*** 0.419*** 0.555*** 0.553***
(0.057) (0.094) (0.167) (0.166)
Sectoral Trade Intensity (TI) 0.378** 0.606*** 0.701*** 1.456***
      with LESS developed countries (0.164) (0.206) (0.231) (0.245)
TI with LEAST developed countries -0.229*** -0.313*** -0.421*** -0.739***
(0.076) (0.084) (0.157) (0.174)
TI with Developed non-EU countries 0.120 -0.019 -0.212 -0.593***
(0.125) (0.160) (0.243) (0.219)
TI with EU countries -0.234** -0.249* -0.417*** -0.682***
(0.114) (0.132) (0.142) (0.189)
-0.069** -0.092**
(0.030) (0.045)
-0.152 -0.718***
(0.121) (0.131)
0.046* 0.094***
(0.027) (0.029)
0.073 0.212***
(0.088) (0.074)
0.015 0.305***
(0.091) (0.110)
TI less X CI 0.400 0.237
(0.288) (0.426)
TI least X CI 0.700*** 0.760***
(0.209) (0.187)
TI developed X CI -0.783*** -0.686***
(0.232) (0.179)
TI EU X CI 0.152 0.058
(0.171) (0.223)
Weights no employment no employment
Observations 390 390 390 390
(CI)2
(TI less)2
(TI least)2
(TI developed)2
(TI EU)2
Notes: OLS regressions in columns 1 and 3. WLS regression in columns 2 and 4. The dataset is a cross section of 390 interviewed firms that
are part of the EU ETS and for which EUTL data, carbon intensity data and geographically precise sectoral trade and carbon intensity data are
available. Robust standard errors, clustered by 4-digit NACE sector, in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10%(*),
5%(**) and 1%(***) level. Includes a constant, country dummies and interview noise controls (not reported). The dependent variable is the
vulnerability score of the firm given by the interviews data. As explanatory variables, CI indicates carbon intensity and TI trade intensity which
are calculated from Eurostat and the EU Commission data. X indicates that the two variables are interacted.
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4.2.2 Refining the trade intensity definition
We have found that the TI criterion is of limited value for proxying a sector’s actual down-
sizing risk. One reason for this could be that this indicator is not precise enough to capture
how exposure to international markets affects downsizing risk. For example, being exposed
to competition from China might affect a firm’s competitiveness in a very different way than
does competition from Australia. Moreover, being export intensive could have different impli-
cations than being import intensive. In order to explore whether a refined TI measure would
give a better indicator of carbon leakage risk, we regress VS on CI and four separate measures
of the intensity of trade with (i) least developed countries, (ii) less developed (or developing)
countries including China and India, (iii) developed non-EU countries and (iv) EU countries.21
These measures are based on figures for the years between 2005 and 2007.
Table 4 summarizes the results of these regressions. Column 1 reveals a strong positive asso-
ciation between vulnerability and TI with less developed countries, which includes China and
other countries that tend to have less stringent environmental regulation standards and which
compete with European manufacturing firms. The relationship between vulnerability and TI
with least developed countries is negative and significant. This could reflect a lack of competi-
tion from such countries as they tend to export agricultural products and natural resources rather
than manufactured goods. High TI with EU countries is negatively associated with the VS. This
is consistent with firms anticipating that their EU competitors will be subject to the same policy
constraints. The findings obtained in the quadratic form, which includes interactions of TI with
CI and squared terms, are qualitatively similar (column 3). In addition, TI with other developed
countries outside the EU only matters in interaction with high CI, in which case vulnerability
is lower. Conversely, the negative link between vulnerability and TI for the least developed
countries is partially offset for the most carbon intensive firms. The employment-weighted re-
gressions (columns 2 and 4) show qualitatively similar results. The most striking difference is
that the coefficient for trade with less developed countries is almost twice as large as in columns
1 and 3. This suggests that using a regionally disaggregated TI measure to assess vulnerability
would be particularly important when the objective is to prevent job leakage.
21The full list of countries is reported in the Appendix. The grouping follows the 2011 UN classification,
available online at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm#developed.
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Table 5: Vulnerability score and export-import intensitites
(1) (2) (3)
Vulnerability Score
Carbon Intensity (CI) 0.224*** 0.240*** 0.457***
(0.055) (0.062) (0.108)
Sectoral Export intensity (EI) -0.071
(0.160)
Sectoral Import intensity (II) 0.141
(0.153)
EI with LESS developed countries 0.100 0.582***
(0.145) (0.193)
II with LESS developed countries 0.298** 0.169
(0.117) (0.162)
EI with LEAST developed countries -0.173* -0.290**
(0.096) (0.118)
II with LEAST developed countries -0.132** -0.094*
(0.059) (0.048)
EI with Developed non-EU countries 0.147 -0.209
(0.191) (0.233)
II with Developed non-EU countries 0.022 0.007
(0.140) (0.198)
EI with EU countries 0.216 0.065
(0.389) (0.661)
II with EU countries -0.461 -0.151
(0.352) (0.606)
Weights no no employment
Observations 390 390 390
Notes: OLS regressions in columns 1 and 2. WLS in column 3. The dataset is a cross-section of 390 interviewed firms that are part of the EU
ETS for which EUTL, geographically precise sectoral trade and carbon intensity data are available. Robust standard errors, clustered by 4-digit
NACE sector, in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***) level. Includes a constant, country
dummies and interview noise controls (not reported). The dependent variable is the vulnerability score of the firm given by the interview data.
In column 3, the firm’s employment is used to weight the regression. As explanatory variables, CI indicates carbon intensity, EI export intensity
and II import intensity which are calculated from Eurostat and the EU Commission data.
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In further specifications, reported in Table 5, we decompose the TI measure into export
intensity (EI) and import intensity (II). The first column shows that these variables on their
own are not strongly correlated with VS. Columns 2 and 3 reveal an interesting heterogeneity.
For the unweighted equation in column 2, the import intensity with less developed countries
becomes significant, whereas for the employment-weighted regression it is the export intensity
that is more strongly associated with a high VS. However, in both cases the point estimates for
both import and export intensity are positive, suggesting that the specifications in Table 4 which
consider overall trade intensity, is a reasonable simplification.
5 Discussion
Our analysis of the correlation between a measure of carbon leakage risk based on managers’
responses, and the carbon leakage criteria applied by the EC has revealed that carbon intensity
is a good proxy for leakage risk whereas trade intensity is not. This mismatch gives rise to
overly generous compensation in the form of free permits granted to trade-exposed industries
that are not really at risk of relocating due to carbon pricing. Based on our results, we have
identified two simple modifications of the carbon leakage criteria that might inform the EC’s
impending review of carbon leakage sectors, scheduled for 2014. The first one is to consider
trade intensive sectors at risk only if they are also carbon intensive. The second modification
suggests the adoption of a more specific TI measure which is based on trade only with less
developed countries rather than with all non-EU countries.
If exemptions from permit auctioning were granted according to these modified criteria,
more emission permits could be auctioned without a significant increase in leakage risk. Given
the scale of the EU ETS, it is worthwhile to perform a back-of-the-envelope calculation of
the resulting increase in auction revenue. To this end, we compile installation-level data on
benchmarking allocations, available for 22 countries, and match in the information on the NACE
industry code, which is needed to assign installations to exemption groups. When computing
the amount of emissions no longer exempt from auctioning under an alternative rule, we take
into account that installations in non-exempt sectors get free permits for only 80% instead of
100% of their benchmark emissions in 2013, and that this proportion falls linearly to 30% until
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Table 6: Reduction of free permit allocation and additional revenue
82.27 100.29 3,008.78 501.46
[70.78; 95.54]  [86.51; 115.54] [2,595.35; 3,466.17] [432.56; 577.69]
8.29 14.35 430.4 71.73
[6.32; 10.17] [9.47; 20.11] [284.11; 603.41] [47.35; 100.57]
Reduction of free 
permit allocation 
(22 countries)  
[MtCO
2
 eq]
Reduction of free 
permit allocation, 
whole EU ETS  
[MtCO
2
 eq]
Additional revenue 
with price of €30 per 
ton [M€]
Additional revenue 
with price of €5 
per ton [M€]
A and B2
A, B1, B2 and C – but TI with 
less developed countries only
Notes: Each row reports the reduction of free permit allocations and additional revenue under a different rule on average per year over 2013-
2020. A, B1, B2 and C refer to the EU criteria defined in Section 2.3. The second row uses trade intensity (TI) with less developed countries
in the definition of groups B and C. MtCO2eq stands for million metric tons of CO2 equivalent. The numbers in brackets report two-sided 95%
confidence intervals of the reductions of free permit allocation and additional revenue obtained from a bootstrap with resampling based on 200
replications.
2020. The results of this exercise are reported in Table 6.
Consider first a modification of the carbon intensity threshold for trade intensive sectors, as
described above. Table 7 lists all sectors that would cease to be exempt from auctioning under
this proposal. For our sample, we calculate that this would yield an additional 82.3 million
emission rights to be auctioned on average per year. The bootstrapped confidence intervals
at the 95% level indicate that the sampling error surrounding this estimate interval is quite
small.22 The point estimate is a lower bound as it does not include (i) a small proportion of
installations that could not be matched to industry codes and (ii) installations in seven countries
for which the NIM data were not publicly available.23 Using aggregate data on emissions in
2009, we scale up the initial estimate to the entire EU ETS and obtain a total of 100.3 million
permits to be auctioned.24 Finally, we translate emissions into revenues using two alternative
allowance prices. The higher price of C30 is considered in keeping with the price used by
the EU Commission (2009) to calculate the carbon intensity of value added. A lower price of
C5 is closer to the market price observed during 2012 and 2013. This leads to an estimate
of additional auction revenue of either C0.5 billion or C3 billion per year, with uncertainty of
±15%.
When the exemption categories are maintained but TI with less developed countries is used
22The bootstrap with resampling is based on 200 replications.
23The Czech Republic, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Norway and Slovenia.
24This is done in two steps. First, for each EUTL sector in each of the 22 countries, extra auctioning is scaled up
by the proportion of matched 2009 allocations for the respective sector-country pair. Second, for each EUTL sector,
additional auctioned permits were divided by the share of the 22 countries in the total, EU ETS wide allocation for
that sector in 2009.
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Table 7: List of additional sectors not to be exempted from auctioning
Sector Descripton Sector Descripton
Processing and preserving of fsh and fsh products 152 2615
Manufacture of crude oils and fats 1541 262
Manufacture of starches and starch products 1562 Manufacture of ceramic tles and fags 263
Manufacture of sugar 1583 Producton of abrasive products 2681
Manufacture of distlled potable alcoholic beverages 1591 Manufacture of tubes 272
Producton of ethyl alcohol from fermented materials 1592 Precious metals producton 2741
Manufacture of wines 1593 Lead, zinc and tn producton 2743
Manufacture of other non-distlled fermented beverages 1595 Manufacture of cutlery 2861
Preparaton and spinning of woollen-type fbres 1712 Manufacture of tools 2862
Preparaton and spinning of worsted-type fbres 1713 2874
Preparaton and spinning of fax-type fbres 1714 Manufacture of other fabricated metal products, n.e.c. 2875
1715 291
Manufacture of sewing threads 1716 Manufacture of furnaces and furnace burners 2921
Preparaton and spinning of other textle fbres 1717 Manufacture of non-domestc cooling and ventlaton equipment 2923
Textle weaving 172 Manufacture of other general purpose machinery n.e.c. 2924
Manufacture of made-up textle artcles, except apparel 174 Manufacture of agricultural and forestry machinery 293
Manufacture of other textles 175 Manufacture of machine- tools 294
Manufacture of knited and crocheted fabrics 176 Manufacture of other special purpose machinery 295
Manufacture of knited and crocheted artcles 177 Manufacture of weapons and ammuniton 296
Manufacture of other wearing apparel and accessories 182 Manufacture of electric domestc appliances 2971
Dressing and dyeing of fur; manufacture of artcles of fur 183 Manufacture of ofce machinery and computers 300
Tanning and dressing of leather 191 Manufacture of electric motors, generators and transformers 311
192 Manufacture of electricity distributon and control apparatus 312
Manufacture of footwear 193 Manufacture of insulated wire and cable 313
201 Manufacture of accumulators, primary cells and primary bateries 314
Manufacture of artcles of cork, straw and plaitng materials 2052 Manufacture of lightng equipment and electric lamps 315
Manufacture of pulp, paper and paperboard 211 Manufacture of other electrical equipment n.e.c. 3162
Manufacture of wallpaper 2124 321
Other publishing 2215 322
Manufacture of refned petroleum products 232 323
Processing of nuclear fuel 233 331
Manufacture of dyes and pigments 2412 332
242 Manufacture of optcal instruments and photographic equipment 334
244 Manufacture of watches and clocks 335
Manufacture of perfumes and toilet preparatons 2452 Building and repairing of ships and boats 351
Manufacture of essental oils 2463 Manufacture of aircraf and spacecraf 353
Manufacture of photographic chemical material 2464 Manufacture of motorcycles and bicycles 354
Manufacture of prepared unrecorded media 2465 Manufacture of other transport equipment n.e.c. 355
Manufacture of other chemical products n.e.c. 2466 Manufacture of jewellery and related artcles 362
Manufacture of man-made fbres 247 Manufacture of musical instruments 363
Manufacture of rubber tyres and tubes 2511 Manufacture of sports goods 364
Manufacture of fat glass 2611 Manufacture of games and toys 365
Manufacture of hollow glass 2613 Miscellaneous manufacturing n.e.c. 366
NACE 
sector code 
(Rev 1.1) 
NACE 
sector code 
(Rev 1.1) 
Manufacture and processing of other glass including technical 
glassware
Manufacture of non-refractory ceramic goods other than for 
constructon purposes; manufacture of refractory ceramic 
Manufacture of fasteners, screw machine products, chain and 
springs
Throwing and preparaton of silk, including from noils, and 
throwing and texturing of synthetc or artfcial flament yarns
Manufacture of machinery for the producton and use of 
mechanical power, except aircraf, vehicle and cycle engines
Manufacture of luggage, handbags and the like, saddlery and 
harness
Sawmilling and planing of wood, impregnaton of wood
Manufacture of electronic valves and tubes and other electronic 
components
Manufacture of television and radio transmiters and  apparatus 
for line telephony and line telegraphy
Manufacture of television and radio receivers, sound or video 
recording or reproducing apparatus and associated goods
Manufacture of medical and surgical equipment and orthopaedic 
appliances
Manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, 
checking, testng, navigatng and other purposes, except 
industrial process control equipment
Manufacture of pestcides and other agro-chemical products
Manufacture of pharmaceutcals, medicinal chemicals and 
botanical products
Notes: The table lists sectors that are exempt from auctioning under the current carbon leakage criteria, but would no longer be exempted under
the first of our proposed rule changes, which is to apply an additional carbon intensity threshold of 5% to trade intensive industries. The list
contains about half of the sectors currently exempted. The EC criteria apply at the 4 digit (NACE Rev. 1.1) sectoral level. For conciseness, we
report the 3-digit sector if all 4-digit sub sectors in a 3-digit sector would cease to be exempted.
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instead of overall TI, the increase in auction revenue is lower, C71 million to C430m million
per year, depending on the allowance price, and estimated somewhat less precisely. While these
revenue estimates are also subject to uncertainty about future carbon emissions and allowance
prices, their order of magnitude shows that the EU is prepared to hand out profit subsidies
to polluting firms on an enormous scale without getting anything in return. This is in line
with the findings by Martin et al. (2014) who compare free permit allocation under the Carbon
Leakage Decision to counterfactual scenarios that (i) minimize the total leakage risk subject
to a maximum amount of free permits or (ii) minimize the amount of free permits subject
to a maximum tolerable leakage risk. Like the present paper, they find a large potential for
improving the efficiency of compensation offered to avoid leakage, even when compensation
rules are based on relatively simple criteria, such as firm-level employment or carbon emissions.
Their normative approach is based on the gradient of the vulnerability score with respect to free
permits, whereas in the present paper we suggest simple improvements based on the correlation
between the level of the vulnerability score and the carbon leakage criteria.
6 Conclusion
While auctioning is poised to become the predominant scheme for allocating emission permits
during the current third trading phase of the EU ETS, free allocation continues at a substantial
scale. The evidence presented in this paper substantiates concerns that the European Commis-
sion compensates polluting industries too generously at the expense of European taxpayers.
Clearly, subsidizing “carbon fat cats”25 in times of deep cuts in public spending could under-
mine political support for emissions trading. However, our analysis also points to a window of
opportunity for European governments to improve the design of the EU ETS significantly while
raising additional revenue in the hundreds of millions of euros annually. Rather than providing
an unspecific subsidy for industry, governments could earmark this money to finance invest-
ments in infrastructure and R&D which are costly but crucial for the transition to a low-carbon
economy. Furthermore, part of the additional revenue could be used to mitigate possibly re-
gressive effects of higher carbon prices on low-income groups. Not least, more permit revenue
25http://www.sandbag.org.uk/maps/companymap/
22
would help to balance strained government budgets in those European countries most affected
by the grand recession.
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Appendix
List of countries
The least developed countries Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina
Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic Of
Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti,
Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives,
Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome And
Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, United Republic Of Tanza-
nia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, Vanuatu, Yemen, Zambia
The less developed or developing countries Algeria, American Samoa, Anguilla, Antigua
and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Aruba, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize,
Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Cayman Islands, Chile,
China, Colombia, Congo, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Cote D’Ivoire, Cuba, Dominica, Domini-
can Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Falkland Islands, Fiji, French Polynesia, Gabon,
Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guam, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Hong Kong, India, Indone-
sia, Islamic Republic Of Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, North Korea,
South Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Lebanon, Libyan, Arab, Jamahiriya, Macao, Malaysia,
Marshall, Islands Mauritius, Mayotte, Mexico, Federated States Of Micronesia, Mongolia,
Montserrat, Morocco, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands Antilles, New Caledonia, Nicaragua, Nige-
ria, Niue, Northern Mariana Islands, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Oman, Pakistan, Palau,
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Pitcairn, Qatar, Saint Helena, Saudi
Arabia, Seychelles, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, St Kitts And Nevis, St Lucia, St Vin-
cent And The Grenadines, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand,
Tokelau, Tonga, Trinidad And Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Turks And Caicos Is-
lands, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet-Nam, Virgin Islands (US),
Virgin Islands (UK), Wallis And Futuna, Zimbabwe.
The developed non-EU countries Albania, Andorra, Australia, Belarus, Bermuda, Bosnia
And Herzegovina, Canada, Croatia, Faroe Islands, Former Yugoslav Republic Of Macedonia,
Gibraltar, Greenland, Holy See, Iceland, Japan, Kosovo, Liechtenstein, Republic Of Moldova,
Montenegro, New Zealand, Norway, Russian Federation, Saint Pierre And Miquelon, San
Marino, Serbia, Serbia And Montenegro, Switzerland, Taiwan, Ukraine, United States.
i
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the vulnerability score
Mean Min P25 Median P75 Max Firms
Overall vulnerability score 1.87 1.29 1 1 1 3 5 725
A. by country
Belgium 1.69 1.13 1 1 1 3 5 122
France 2.07 1.34 1 1 1 3 5 136
Germany 2.12 1.58 1 1 1 3 5 131
Hungary 1.50 0.95 1 1 1 2 4 68
Poland 2.03 1.40 1 1 1 3 5 74
UK 1.75 1.12 1 1 1 3 5 194
B. by 3-digit sector
Cement 2.33 1.52 1 1 1 4 5 63
Ceramics 2.15 1.46 1 1 1 3 5 13
Chemical & Plastic 1.86 1.26 1 1 1 3 5 118
Construction 1.00 0.00 1 1 1 1 1 3
Fabricated Metals 1.67 0.93 1 1 1 3 4 45
Food & Tobacco 1.56 1.01 1 1 1 2 5 106
Fuels 2.71 1.59 1 1 3 4 5 14
Furniture & NEC 1.47 0.87 1 1 1 2 4 17
Glass 2.76 1.57 1 1 3 4 5 29
Iron & Steel 2.69 1.56 1 1 3 4 5 39
Machinery & Optics 1.26 0.68 1 1 1 1 4 68
Other Basic Metals 1.78 1.39 1 1 1 2 5 9
Other Business Services 2.67 0.58 2 2 3 3 3 3
Other Minerals 3.38 1.69 1 2 4 5 5 8
Publishing 1.58 1.02 1 1 1 2 4 19
TV Communication 1.91 1.45 1 1 1 3 5 11
Textile & Leather 1.90 1.33 1 1 1 3 5 20
Vehicles 1.62 0.99 1 1 1 2 4 47
Wholesale 1.40 0.89 1 1 1 1 3 5
Wood & Paper 1.85 1.36 1 1 1 3 5 88
Standard 
deviation
Notes: Summary statistics of the overall vulnerability score (first row), by country (panel A) and by 3-digit NACE sector (panel B). The score
ranges from 1 (no impact) to 5 (complete relocation). A score of 3 is given if at least 10% of production of employment would be outsourced
in response to future carbon pricing. NEC: Not elsewhere classified.
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